Meta-analysis has become one of the greatest growth areas in medical research. This continually expanding use of the technique can be justified on the grounds that meta-analysis can have an objectivity that is inevitably lacking in literature reviews and can achieve a greater precision and generalizability of findings than any single study. They therefore have the potential to provide more definitive evidence for policy-making in therapeutic, preventative and diagnostic medicine than can be realised by any other means. However, while meta-analyses (or overviews) have some forceful and very active proponents from both statistical and clinical backgrounds, there remain sceptics who feel that the conclusions drawn from meta-analyses often go beyond what the technique and the data justify.T he articles contained in this issue provide a timely and informative appraisal of the current state-of-the-art in meta-analysis methodology and practice. Statistical methods, constructive criticism, the need for good quality control and the reality of a specific major example are presented in a collection of views that should prove very helpful in providing a balanced assessment of both the mechanics and interpretation of metaanalyses. In addition, I am grateful to have this opportunity to provide my own brief perspective on some of the key principles, both practical and statistical, that we should focus on in evaluating any particular meta-analysis.
Perhaps the greatest single concern is over the selection of which studies to include. I believe this problem has three components: breadth, quality and representativeness. By the term breadth I mean the decision on whether to study a very specific narrow question (e.g. the same drug, disease and setting for studies following a common protocol) or a more generic problem (e.g. a broad class of treatments for a range of conditions in a variety of settings, as exemplified by Thompson's cholesterol reduction trials in this issue). The broader the meta-analysis, the more difficulty there is in interpreting the combined evidence as regards future policy. For instance, one may reach a very clear conclusion that a statistical association exists, but if the individual studies vary markedly in their design it would be inappropriate to assume that the combined overall estimate of effect is applicable in all circumstances. Thus the broader the meta-analysis is, the more it needs to be interpreted qualitatively rather than quantitatively. That is, a broad conclusion about evidence for the presence or absence of an association may be clearly warranted, but greater caution is needed regarding any specific estimates of the association's magnitude.
It is obvious that the reliability of a meta-analysis is dependent on the quality of data in the included studies. For instance, in clinical trials one should look for adherence to recognized criteria of acceptability (e.g. randomization, appropriate blinding, analysis by intention to treat) and any relaxation of such standards requires careful consideration as to whether the consequent precision of more data is counter-productive, given the increased potential for bias and loss of credibility.
It is a trickier matter to ensure that a meta-analysis is truly representative or comprehensive. Failure to identify all eligible studies carries a serious risk of distortion, whether this be due to publication bias or missing published studies. Confidence in the overall quality of a meta-analysis is greatly enhanced if explicit efforts are made to identify all studies (i.e. not just the published literature). Furthermore, it has been proposed that meta-analysis of individual data from every study provides the most reliable evidence,' being less prone to the variability of how individual researchers have presented their results.
There are four main statistical objectives in any meta-analysis: consistent objective display of data, testing of an overall null hypothesis, estimation of an average magnitude of association, and investigation of any statistical heterogeneity. Let us briefly review each of these.
I would give considerable weight to the first of these, data display, since it is usually highly informative and without controversy. A single figure displaying point estimates and confidence intervals for the individual studies is often sufficient to show at a glance what the broad conclusions of a meta-analysis are. The experienced eye gives more focus to the studies with smaller confidence intervals, and one can usually see which range of 'effects' are plausible in terms of being covered by all (or nearly all) the confidence intervals. Indeed, for some meta-analyses one might question the need to proceed any further in terms of statistical technique, especially if (1) the issue is broad, (2) there are doubts regarding quality or representativeness or (3) some individual studies are large.
A global test of significance for the overall null hypothesis of no effect in all studies, for instance a Mantel-Haenszel test for binary response in clinical trials, is statistically valid but requires cautious interpretation. A highly significant result provides evidence that a real association (treatment difference in clinical trials) exists in some circumstances investigated, but should not be taken as blanket evidence of association in the full range of circumstances studied, particularly if the meta-analysis is broad.
Greater controversy exists when one considers the methods for deriving an overall estimate of the magnitude of effect. The 'fixed effect' method is the most commonly used, and produces a weighted mean of the individual study estimates, weights being inversely proportional to the sampling variances. An overall confidence interval, inevitably narrower than the interval for any single study, can also be derived. The trouble is that this method is reliant on the strong assumption that there is no true heterogeneity between studies: i.e. they are all estimating the same true effect and only differ because of sampling variation. In most meta-analyses, this assumption is implausible given the variety of study designs, including inconsistencies in methodological rigour. The degree of possible departure from such a homogeneity assumption is usually a matter of personal judgement, since any overall statistical test for heterogeneity lacks power. Thus, when such a test is nonsignificant one cannot assert that the fixed effect method is correct; all one can declare is that major heterogeneity is not present.
Since clinical heterogeneity (i.e. differences in study design) is usually evident, there is a conceptual difficulty in defining what the fixed effect method is actually estimating. Perhaps it is best thought of as a weighted average of the individual study true effects, but then how closely this relates to a general population average effect depends on the representativeness of those studies to the population of interest. The 'fixed effects' confidence interval reflects only the uncertainty attributable to sampling variation, and cannot reflect the extra uncertainty (lack of credibility?) inherent in combining evidence from disparate studies. However, this problem is conceptually the same as combining data from different centres in a multi-centre study. The conventional analysis stratified by centre is the 'fixed effect' model and rarely raises concern. Perhaps the difference is of degree in that centres should have conformed to a common protocol, thus reducing the risk of serious heterogeneity.
The 'random effects' method is an alternative meta-analytic approach which attempts to incorporate statistical heterogeneity into the overall estimate of an average effect. However, I feel the method has both conceptual and practical problems: it assumes the studies are a random 'sample' from a hypothetical 'population' of such studies, its attempt to estimate a between-study variance in true effects will usually lack precision, and if heterogeneity does exist it gives substantially more weight to the smaller studies than the fixed effect method and smaller studies are often of poorer quality. Perhaps the random effects method is sometimes a useful illustrative complement to the fixed effect method (i.e. are the conclusions the same?) but in general I prefer the latter unless major heterogeneity is present. However, in that case should a combined estimate be attempted at all?
If statistical heterogeneity does exist in a meta-analysis, it seems more important to explore the reasons for that heterogeneity than to model it with random effects. Thus, one needs to examine either informally or by statistical analysis which characteristics of the studies or the individuals within the studies might explain why heterogeneity exists, and this is likely to be most productive if one has the raw individual data available.
One criticism of meta-analyses is that they sometimes try too hard to summarize data from disparate studies into a single estimate of effect, and I feel their credibility would be enhanced further if a more self-critical recognition of the technique's limitations was expressed by proponents and authors. Neither fixed nor random effects methods can be rigorously validated and hence any global numerical statement arising out of a meta-analysis should always be qualified by concerns about the breadth, quality and representativeness of the studies incorporated. Competent and comprehensive metaanalyses are substantial undertakings which have justifiably had a major influence on health policy in a number of key areas. I hope this issue is helpful in furthering people's understanding of both their practical value and their statistical basis. 
